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Introduction 
The study of children in early childhood has, for most of the last 100 years, been 
dominated by developmental perspectives. This has resulted not only in a huge 
body of work documenting, accounting for and theorising how children grow up 
(controversies notwithstanding), but has also led to early childhood being in effect 
›colonised‹ by this type of science and by questions of development and change. 
Qvortrup (1994: 4) summed this up as a dominant focus on what children will be-
come to the neglect of what they are as persons in their early life. This hegemonic 
emphasis on development has been to the detriment of understanding childhood 
and children’s lives from a fully social scientific perspective. Until the 1990s the 
grip of developmental framings of the study of children and childhood left little 
room for sociological accounts of childhood, other than those stemming from 
theories of socialisation. This situation was challenged by sociological work which 
foregrounded an empirical sensibility towards children as social actors. This opened 
up a space of enquiry for understanding the social significance of the subjectivities 
of children and the implications of these for analyses and theorisations of both 
those social phenomena which are directly relevant for children and/or childhood 
and those which intersect with children’s lives and social worlds1. The need for 
this kind of sociological perspective has had its main impact via studies involving 
children in middle childhood, partly because of the emphasis on children’s voices 
in the new sociology of childhood (Thorne, 2008; McNamee and Seymour, 2013) 
although there is some notable work on younger age children using a broader 
range of methodological approaches (see for example Waksler, 1991; Danby and 
Baker, 1998a; Clark and Moss, 2001; Warming, 2011; Di Santo and Berman, 2012). 
Early childhood stands out in that it is a period of time defined by the legally 
regulated absence of a particular institution in children’s lives: school.  Thus, it is 
a societal construct which is quite clearly operationalized around both age (from 
birth) and the commencement of a social status (›school-age‹)2.  Nonetheless, chil-
dren who are ‘pre-school’ are still the focus of many educational interventions and 
1 Which is necessarily all phenomena in society since children are living in society from birth and 
hence, as for every other member of society, are directly or indirectly part of the production of 
those phenomena to greater or lesser extents as well as being affected, again directly or indirectly, 
by them. Children are never outside society.  
2 The OECD (2006) defines early childhood as being the period from birth to starting compulsory 
schooling although this is problematic as the latter differs between countries.   
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policies if they spend any time in the early childhood institutions, ranging from day 
care centres which provide day care for children from a few months old up to school 
age to more formalised ›early years‹ educational settings such as kindergartens and 
nursery schools3. Young children’s own world views and the meanings they ascribe 
to their interactions and experiences in these institutional settings have little sta-
tus as relevant or valid knowledge in relation to these interventions and policies 
and hence are mostly treated as irrelevant or viewed through an evaluative lens 
of development theory or considerations of the socialisation process. In addition, 
early childhood is generally considered in Western cultures as a state suspended 
between nature and culture and hence not yet fully social4. Taken together, the 
emphasis on developmental and socialisation processes along with children in early 
childhood being ascribed the status of being between nature and culture results in 
their potential to be informants about their own lives being overlooked or assumed 
to be highly problematic from an adult perspective. 
However, I argue in this paper that there is a pressing need now for a strong 
sociological engagement with children in the early years of their life since up until 
now they have largely been seen to belong to the domains of development (physical 
and psychological), the arena of the family, and the province of the care by parents. 
The need for this is pressing because in recent years early childhood has become 
increasingly visible to policy makers and politicians as a site for intervention in 
socio-political and economic respects. This is reflected in the plethora of schemes 
and policies developed around early child care and education, such as those to be 
found in the EU, in the USA, and within different specific countries which draw on 
developmental psychology, cognitive sciences, socialisation theories, and educatio-
nal sciences. Poor and disadvantaged young children in particular have come to be 
seen as projects, one might even say they have come to be seen as subjects in need 
of rescue from poor parenting and low societal expectations, by governments and 
the discipline of early childhood education alike in pursuit of society level goals of 
economic growth and societal stability. In the light of this, sociology’s contribution 
to understanding life as a young child becomes important both as a corrective to the 
over-emphasis on growing up and future prospects at the expense of insights into 
day to day lives, and as a counter-balance to the increasing ideological colonisation 
of early childhood by the interests of capitalism.  
This paper addresses the question of whether the sociological argument for the 
legitimacy of understanding children as social actors, as set out by Prout and James 
(1990), can be used for the study of very young children. I explore the limitations 
of this approach in relation to research with children of any age, and argue that the 
concept of agency, as conceptualised both in childhood studies and in sociology more 
broadly, needs more critical reflection if it is to be of use analytically in childhood 
studies in general and in early childhood work in particular. I then argue that the 
concept of social competence (Hutchby and Moran-Ellis, 1998a; 1998b) needs to be 
incorporated with thinking about children as social actors and questions of agency 
in order to take the structural and intergenerational dynamics of children’s lives 
3 In the UK this can also be the nursery school which is attached to an infant/primary school and 
which caters for children from age 3 until they start in the formal school around the age of 5, pos-
sibly as early as 6 months prior to their 5th birthday. 
4 See Latour (1993) on the question of nature-culture hybridities in modernity and Lee and Motkau 
(2011) on hybridity and childhood. 
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more strongly into account. This latter is essential for developing robust empirical 
evidence of young children’s agency and actorship as a step prior to interpreting 
the implications of this for policy formation and implementation. 
History of social scientific study of children and childhood
To study children and childhood would seem to necessitate a recognition of a histori-
cally and culturally shaped set of subjects and subjectivities, and of a socio-politically 
driven structure within society which intersects with other structures such as class, 
ethnicity, gender, sexuality and so on. However, despite this, the social sciences that 
have claimed children and childhood have primarily been pedagogy and psycholo-
gy. Carmen Luke (1989), in her Foucauldian inspired history of childhood, argues 
that the current Western concept of the child emerged first in Germany in the 16th 
century5 when religious authority (in the shape of Luther) determined the child, as 
a figure, and children as individuals, to be the proper subjects of a pedagogy which 
would enable them to attain salvation as adults. Over the ensuing three centuries, 
she argues, pedagogy, transformed from its emphasis on salvation by the industrial 
revolution and woven into the project of modern Capitalism, became orientated 
to the production of workers. This shift in orientation intersected with the new 
science of psychology to create a space within which childhood was formulated as 
a period of intense but systematic change which could best be dealt with by the 
new science of developmental psychology and the burgeoning science of education 
(which was also largely heavily influenced by developmental thinking). This set the 
stage for the description of childhood as a period of development from instinctual 
cognition at birth through various stages of cognitive change to maturity. Starting 
with Piaget (1926; 1929)6 in Western Europe who mapped an unfolding, natural, 
universal sequence of development, albeit with some links to social context (see 
Burman, 2008), and Vygotsky (1934/1962) in the Soviet Union who located this 
process of change and growth in capacities at the intersection between learning, 
development and environment, childhood was positioned as primarily a period of 
›becoming‹ (Qvortrup 1994) with children’s own subjectivities either sentimenta-
lised (Zelizer, 1981) or dismissed as irrelevant. 
Burman (2008) notes how the time and nature of the emergence of developmental 
psychology in Europe marks it as a science of the industrialised West, and how its 
orientation to normativity as a foundation for its empirical and theoretical work 
put it in a powerful position vis a vis defining the parameters and meaning of child-
hood. Sociology came later to the question of children, doing so primarily through 
the concept of socialisation which shared many common roots with developmental 
psychology, not least the virtually exclusive emphasis on studying children in terms 
5 This sets the emergence of the beginning of a modern childhood one hundred years earlier than 
that established by Aries (1962) in his study of childhood in France (in the Ancient Regime). Luke 
attributes this largely to the persistence of Catholicism in France which positioned children in a 
different way to Lutheranism. 
6 It is also worth mentioning J. B. Watson here who stood in some contrast to these developmental 
views with his emphasis on using behavioural conditioning techniques as a child rearing strat-
egy, treating children as young adults, and rejecting ideas of instinct and internal processes of 
development. Watson’s emphasis was on the shaping of external behaviours through processes 
of classical conditioning (Watson and Watson, 1928).  
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of the future adults they would become. So, for most of the twentieth century, the 
dominance of both developmental psychology and socialisation led to an almost 
exclusive focus in the social sciences on mapping and marking children’s progress 
towards adult functioning and societal membership as adults. This emphasis however 
is not incidental. There has been a clear interplay between the format of childhood 
and the nature of modernity (Aries, 1962; Cunningham, 1995; Luke, 1989) and, as 
Hendrick (1990) and Turmel (2008) both show, measuring, charting and intervening 
in the physical, social, moral and intellectual growth and development of children 
has been axiomatic to the capitalist project of Western industrialised societies. In 
addition, this form of surveillance of children opened up sites through which the 
private family could be governed (Donzelot, 1979) via the policing gaze of the 
social worker, the educationalist and the health worker. 
Underpinning the concept of socialisation in sociology was a concern with accoun-
ting for how children become enculturated members of society from an assumed 
starting point of being utterly un-civilised at birth and hence belonging solely to 
the realm of nature7. The question of how individuals come to have a relationship 
to wider society from an acultural starting point dominated anthropological and 
sociological thinking in the early part of the twentieth century. Durkheim consi-
dered this to be a foundational question although, as van de Walle notes (2008, 
2011), Durkheim’s conception of socialisation was a process primarily to do with 
the building of a specific kind of relationship between a member of society and 
society as authority rather than a process of individualised internalisation of culture. 
As Durkheim puts it:
7 James, Jenks and Prout (1998) have argued that in effect the dominance of socialisation represented 
a pre-sociological engagement with children since it extracted and abstracted them from society 
as a whole and constituted them as pre-social subjects. 
»The child, on entering life, brings only his 
individual nature. Society finds itself then, with 
each new generation, faced with a virtually clean 
slate on which it must start anew. It is necessary 
that...to the egoistic and asocial being just born, 
[society] must add another, capable of leading a 
moral and social life« (Durkheim cited in Laman-
na, 2002: 126-7).
Parsons and Bales (1955), following Parsons’ work on social systems and roles 
(1951), focused on developing a theory of socialisation which could account for 
the processes by which societies produce the ›right‹ kind of citizens: those who 
conform to the norms and values of the society within which they live and who 
are thus cultural members of the society into which they were born and in which 
they have grown to maturity. They set out a case for understanding socialisation as 
a process for which first the family (primary socialisation) and then social institu-
tions such as schools (secondary socialisation) were responsible, and consisting of 
mechanisms that inculcate the internalisation of societal/cultural norms and values 
during childhood and adolescence. This formulation of socialisation differed from 
that of Durkheim in that these processes were considered to mainly involve the 
stabilisation of personality on the basis that human personalities are the products 
of cultural and social processes, not expressions of inborn essences. In Parsonian 
socialisation, the family is thought of as a factory in which human personality is 
produced and one which is essential for producing the stabilised adult personalities 
which are needed for society to function effectively (Parsons and Bales, 1955:16). 
Parsons did, however, note that whilst adult society positioned socialisation as the 
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core enterprise in childhood, and his theory of society placed it as the raison d’etre 
for the existence of the nuclear family with strong gendered roles in industrialised 
societies, it was not confined to that period in the lifecourse: 
»The term socialization in its current usage in the 
literature refers primarily to the process of child 
development. This is in fact a crucially important 
case of the operation of what are here called 
the mechanisms of socialization, but it should 
be made clear that the term is here used in a 
broader sense than the current one to designate 
the learning of any orientations of functional 
significance to the operation of a system of 
complementary role-expectations. In this sense, 
socialization, like learning, goes on throughout 
life. The case of the development of the child is 
only the most dramatic because he has so far to 
go.« (Parsons, 1951:142)
This formulation of childhood as the prime time for socialisation and the family 
as the prime initial site of socialisation increased in importance in the middle part 
of the 20th century as concerns about the reconstruction of social order in society in 
the post-war years in the USA and UK  intersected with anxieties about the spread 
of communism from Eastern bloc countries along with the politics of the Cold War. 
During this period both psychology and sociology worked with the figure of the 
child as something of a ‘tabula rasa’, formulated by Durkheim as a ‘clean slate’, or 
by as an empty vessel into which the values and mores of society were poured by 
parents, educationalists and other credible adults. Moreover, the functionality of 
society is haunted by the spectre of the unsocialised individual:  
 »First it is quite clear that the orientations which an actor implements in his complementary interaction 
in roles are not inborn but have to be acquired 
through learning. We may then say that before 
he has learned a given role-orientation he clearly 
tends to act in ways which would upset the equi-
librium of interaction in his incumbency in the 
role in question« (Parsons, 1951:141)
The dominance of socialisation as 
the core social process of childhood 
remained even after critiques of Parsonian functionalism had made their mark 
on both the theory and the assumptions on which it was founded with respect to 
accounting for the existence of social institutions such as the family and the school 
(see for example Wrong, 1961; Mackay, 1973; Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Stacey and 
Thorne, 1985). The socialisation approach to children and childhood not only re-
tained the assumptions of functionalism with respect to the role of the family and 
of schools in society, but also conceptualised the child as a problem for society (a 
disturbance) whilst uncivilised, as indelibly marked by what is learnt in childhood, 
in the socialisation meaning of learning, and as a passive subject in the socialisation 
process.  The impact of this on the study of children and childhood in sociology was 
considerable and it was not until the 1980s that alternative sociological perspectives 
were brought to bear to any great extent. 
Throughout the 1990s a new body of sociological work emerged which presented 
strong critiques of the Parsonian conceptualisation of childhood (see for example 
Alanen 1988; Blitzer, 1991; Corsaro, 1993), whilst other work challenged its domi-
nance as the primary empirical and theoretical tool for understanding children’s 
lives and the nature of childhood as a social condition and social structure (see 
James and Prout, 1990; Blitzer, 1991; Waksler, 1991; Mayall 1994; Hutchby and 
Moran-Ellis 1998a to cite a few). These critiques ushered in a new approach in 
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sociology for looking at children, one which empirically and theoretically inves-
tigated their status as active social actors and which opened up the possibility of 
understanding their actions as agentic rather than as the signs of development and 
socialisation, or lack thereof. 
Key shift in sociological thinking about children –  
the agency agenda 
This shift towards conceptualising children as social actors mounted a set of de-
cisive challenges against the presumption of children’s passivity in the process 
of ›growing up‹, and against the primacy of socialisation as the main theoretical 
basis for sociological engagement with children’s lives (Buehler-Niederberger and 
Suenker, 2012). This radical move was crystallized in the UK in the publication 
of Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (James and Prout, 1990), an edited 
collection of empirical and theoretical reconsiderations of children as social actors 
and their capacity to be agentic. As Gallacher and Gallagher (2008) comment, 
James and Prout set up two key imperatives: 
 »that children should be studied for and in them-
selves, not simply as a means of understanding 
the adult world or of addressing its concerns; 
and that researchers should be attentive to the 
peculiarities and specificities of individual child-
hoods as geographically, historically and socially 
situated…« (Gallacher and Gallagher, 2008: 500) 
Specifically, James and Prout argued that children are and must be seen as active 
in the construction and determination of their own social lives, the lives of those 
around them and of the societies in which they live. Thus, children are not just 
passive subjects of social structures and processes but are engaged as social actors 
in society. What it means to be a social actor in the terms that James and Prout set 
out bears some examination, however,  to clarify how this differs from ideas of the 
individual as an actor which are embedded within Parsons’ concept of socialisation. 
In essence, the key difference is that for Parsons the status of being a social actor 
(with all that entails in terms of acting within the parameters of societal norms 
and values) is the outcome of the process of socialisation and hence is something 
associated with adults and not children. In this theoretical frame, whilst children 
obviously act and interact, this is understood scientifically in terms of the process 
of learning to be fully human. This frames adults as acting and children as learning. 
This then means that from a Parsonian perspective, children’s actions are part of 
the material worked in socialisation and contained when successfully transformed 
into appropriate role-orientations (Parsons, 1951). Whilst this recognises children 
as actors of a sort, the social significance of their actions is neutralised through 
reconfiguration as raw material, evidence of individual progress in internalising 
societal norms and values, or indicative of the need for further learning and deve-
lopment.  Children’s actions are not seen as being of significance for society beyond 
this unless they imply future failure or future danger. 
The proposition made by James and Prout sought to treat children’s actions dif-
ferently. The repositioning of children as social actors meant they should be seen 
as people who act with meaning and who can be agentic. James and Prout draw 
on interpretive sociology and its emphasis on action beyond the determination of 
systems of social organisation to underpin their argument more broadly:
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»…it was from interpretive sociology that much 
of the impetus to re-examine the role of children 
as active meaning-producing beings came. Inter-
pretive sociology stresses the creative production 
(›agency‹) of social life rather than the determi-
nation of social behaviour by systems of social 
organization…« (Prout and James, 1990:27-28)
In their approach, which became known as the new sociology of childhood in 
the UK7, the nature of being a social actor consists of being a meaning-making 
individual, a person who experiences and encounters the world and makes sense 
of it within the frame (or frames) available to them in a dynamic and personalised 
way. Furthermore, this meaning-making is seen as linked to how people (includ-
ing children) act. On this basis, James and Prout argued that children are social 
actors and hence also have agency. However, this latter move in the argument for 
sociologically re-envisioning children is not as straightforward as it might appear. 
There is a degree of slippage between meaning-making, acting and agency which 
implies that agency can be treated as synonymous with acting. However, if this is the 
case then why consider agency as a distinct bounded concept? Or, if it is different, 
then how is it different? This question of quite what agency is has largely been left 
unaddressed even whilst it has been used conceptually and analytically in many 
studies of children from this new standpoint. In the next section I examine agency 
as a concept within sociology and reflect on how it needs to be conceptualised, or 
re-conceptualised, with respect to children. 
The slippage between action and agency, and the ambiguity about what the concept 
encapsulates is a problem in sociology more generally. Agency has been described 
as something of a ›black box‹ (Emirbayer/Mische, 1998; Campbell, 2009) and a 
›slippery‹ concept (Hitlin/Elder, 2007). Alexander (1992) (cited in Campbell, 2009) 
notes that there is often a conflation of agency and action in sociological thinking 
which results in the loss of distinction between behaving, acting, and being agentic. 
Where distinctions are drawn, agency may be specified as the »socioculturally medi-
ated capacity to act« (Ahearn, 2001: 112) or in terms of the role of purpose, volition 
and intention in acting (Ritzer, 2005: 8).  However, Willmott (1999: 9) argues that, 
whilst agency may be accepted by some as the capacity to ›do otherwise‹ through 
intention, the capacity to be agentic depends on the power individuals can mobilise 
to implement their desired goal or achieve their intention. Where structural forces 
are greater than the power that individual agents can mobilise, their agency may lie 
only in resistance to the dominant conditions (which brings its own costs) rather 
than in effecting change or making a difference. 
Giddens’ work in this area adds a further component to the nature of being an 
agent. Linking agency to the essence of being a human, he argues:  
7 In Continental Europe and the USA this is more often coined as the new social studies of childhood 
to indicate multi-disciplinary approaches which start with the children-as-social-actors perspective. 
»To be a human being is to be a purposive agent 
who both has reasons for his or her activities and 
is able, if asked, to elaborate discursively upon 
those reasons…As social actors, all human be-
ings are highly ›learned‹ in respect of knowledge 
which they possess, and apply, in the production 
and reproduction of day-to-day social encoun-
ters.« (Giddens, 1984: 3;22)
His vision of what it is to be a social actor is reflected very strongly in the pro-
position James and Prout make and yet this further component presents some 
problems for early childhood studies in particular, and perhaps childhood studies 
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more generally7. Taking the point about being able to ›elaborate discursively‹ upon 
reasons for actions: in this formulation the purposiveness in the action has to be 
communicable discursively; the agent must be able to account for their reasons 
for acting in the way they did. This presupposes particular cognitive and linguistic 
capacities along with some degree of reflexivity. The agent must have decided on 
certain actions for some purpose that they can share with another. This would 
seem to limit agency to being a property of certain cognitive and linguistic ma-
turity and so rule out preverbal children or others for whom this is problematic. 
Since Giddens links this to the nature of being human, the logical extension of this 
position would be that those who lack these capacities are other than human. We 
can see here how Giddens’ conceptualisation of the human being is predicated 
on the figure of an adult who has both intention and power to act – the figure of 
the rational, accountable individual in modernity. If these conceptualisations of 
agency are right, then children are placed outside the field of agency and human 
›being-ness‹ if and when their actions are not perceived to be intentional or they 
are perceived to lack the capacity to ›act otherwise‹ whether that be through lack 
of cognitive capacity and/or lack of social imagination. The claim of childhood 
studies about children’s agency potentially stands in fundamental tension with 
this conceptualisation of agency in Giddens’ sociology since if we accept agency 
as being at the heart of being human, then for the shift to thinking about children 
as ›human beings‹ from positioning them primarily as ›human becomings‹ (to use 
Qvorturp’s phrase) to be convincing it must be possible that children can also be 
agents. Furthermore, if agency involves purposive action, then children’s actions 
have to be discernible as having a purpose, and if it also involves making some 
change in a situation, that change needs to be both observable and reliably linked 
to the action. But to what extent is it necessary that the actor(s) be able to explain 
what they are doing? I.e. to what extent is Giddens’ discursive component critical 
for the condition of being agentic?  If that requirement is removed, is it still possible 
to empirically observe children acting purposively and effectively, even in the case 
of children in their early years? 
The answer to these questions is a simple yes. And that yes applies at even quite 
young ages.  Over the period since James and Prout published their 1990 edited 
collection there has been a wealth of empirical literature documenting and ana-
lysing children’s actions and interactions (in recent times see for example Olli et 
al, 2012, and see also multiple issues of the journals Childhood and Children and 
Society) and generating analyses which support classing children as individuals who 
have the capacity to be agentic, and are demonstrably exercising agency in their 
everyday worlds at even quite young ages. The only barrier then is the question of 
whether young children, say those between the ages of 2 and 5 years of age can act 
with purpose in a discernible way. An example is instructive here: Lam and Pollard 
(2006) analysed two children’s engagement, or rather lack of engagement, with a 
teaching task in kindergarten:
 
8 And would also have significant repercussions for disability studies in relation to adults and 
children with communication difficulties. 
8
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»Both of these children were reluctant to do 
pre-writing exercises. They avoided it by putting 
the exercises to the bottom of their priority during 
activity time until the teachers ›caught‹ them. 
When the teachers addressed them individually, 
they avoided it by drifting around pretending to 
get the pre-writing exercises from the shelf... 
Throughout the year, they eventually mastered 
the skills [that the pre-writing exercises were 
designed to support – JME] but they were among 
the last few children to finish the pre-writing ex-
ercises. This example shows that these children…
were active, creative and strategic practitioners 
in the classroom.« (Lam and Pollard, 2006: 135)
Here it is possible to see that the ability to elaborate discursively is not at stake 
for the children’s intention and purpose to be discernible through analysis of their 
patterned actions which looks at the content, outcomes and effects of their actions. 
I would argue that this example shows that Giddens’ discursive element is in effect 
a weak proxy for the need to know an actor’s intentions and purpose in order to 
interpret the nature of action. By  broadening our methodological perspectives, 
we can utilise ways of understanding and discerning intention and goals which do 
not rely on participants being able to verbally account for themselves. 
There are two other components in this example which are of relevance for the 
question of children’s agency in particular settings: 1. the children managed their 
agentic actions without disturbing or challenging the formal social ordering of the 
kindergarten, i.e. they did not get in to trouble for their actions, and 2. they mobilised 
material resources in the setting such as moving materials around to simulate the 
action the teacher required. We can deduce from 1 that the children were aware 
of, or took into account, the formal pedagogical order of the setting, and from 2 
that they were aware of what the teacher-desired action looked like on the surface. 
These skills have also been amply demonstrated by Waksler (1991) and Danby and 
Baker (1998a, 1998b) – I discuss the latter in more detail below. 
A further dimension to their agency is that of scale. The purposive action of the 
children took place within the small scale setting of the kindergarten. Deciding on 
an action or set of actions to achieve a goal is inevitably a contextual and contingent 
event. The context was that of the classroom setting, and the children’s capacity to 
be agentic was contingent on being able to circulate round the space of the class-
room and determine their own priorities within activity time. The coming together 
of these with the temporal dimension enabled them to subvert the agenda of the 
teacher (the doing of the pre-writing exercises). The scope of their observable 
agency was limited to that activity within that setting and so we cannot conclude 
anything about other settings without other empirical work. For children both 
scale and scope are strongly limited by the structural and institutional conditions 
of childhood and by inter-generational power relations8. Whilst these are specific 
to the structural conditions of being a child, they also parallel those which operate 
in the structural and institutional conditions of adult lives. In addition, children’s 
capacity for agency is limited or thwarted by the same constraints which operate 
in adult lives. For both adult and child, the capacity to be agentic is a product of 
the interplay between individual desires and the exercise of power and authority 
by other actors, including institutional actors.  
8 Given the embodied nature of agency, analyses should also take account of how physical em-
bodied features of being a child may be relevant as constraints on agency or, indeed, operate as 
facilitators of childhood agency. See Prout (2000) and James (2000) on the issue of embodiment, 
self, and agency in childhood. 
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Other work supports the proposition that children can be meaning-makers and 
act with purpose at earlier points in their lives. Cremin and Slatter (2004) explored 
what 3 and 4 year olds thought about their day care whilst Forrester (2002) analysed 
2 year olds’ constructions of childhood and the meaning with which they imbue 
this construct in their everyday conversations.  
Whilst empirical work such as the work of Lam and Pollard above goes a long 
way towards demonstrating the ways in which young children can be agentic wi-
thout being asked or required to account for their actions, there is another point 
that needs addressing. This is the tendency in childhood studies to treat agency 
as an internal property of the self. This tendency is problematic because it fails to 
take fully into account the interactional power relations and institutional power 
relations within which any act is embedded. Hutchby and Moran-Ellis (1998a) 
sought to address this particular problematic by treating agency as a property of 
interactional relations in material settings. 
Agency and social competence 
Hutchby and Moran-Ellis framed agency as an interactional accomplishment and 
hence as a situated event produced by the dynamic between individuals, the po-
wer relations pertaining in that situation, and the resources which are effectively 
mobilised by the different actors in the course of the interaction: 
»…children’s social competence is a constantly 
negotiated dynamic, a phenomenon which is 
stabilized, to a greater or lesser degree, in and 
through the interactions between human actors 
and the material and cultural resources which 
are available and which can be recruited to play 
a part in the constitution of specific, situated 
activities«. (Hutchby and Moran-Ellis, 1998b: 15) 
Clarifying this, they argue that competence is not an inherent characteristic of 
children in general or a child in particular, rather it 
»…has more to do with children’s ability to 
manage their social surroundings, to engage 
in meaningful social action within given inter-
actional contexts.« (Hutchby and Moran-Ellis, 
1998b: 16)
The term ›social competence‹ encompasses being culturally and socially skilled 
in interaction, and able to act with reference to the rules and precepts of a social 
ordering in a setting, whether that is the form of compliance, subversion, resistance 
or appropriation. For this it is necessary to be a social actor, ie a meaning-making 
human being but this is not sufficient. Social competence allows for the possibility 
that whilst a child may be a social actor who is designing their actions to achieve 
particular purposes, they may nonetheless not succeed in attaining the effects they 
desire – ie they may or may not be agentic. Agency then is an accomplishment, achie-
ved through interaction not a property possessed by the individual. When children 
act in strategic ways as actors and agents and their actions reflect, and maintain or 
create, social orderings, they are being socially competent even if they are not able 
to change the situation they are in. They are demonstrably ›acting otherwise‹ but 
the effect of their actions may be neutralised, over-ruled or successfully opposed 
by another. Social competence and agency are always linked to the interactional 
contexts in which the children are present, their interactions with the other peo-
ple who are part of the fabric of the interaction, and to the resources that can be 
mobilised at the time either in directly material ways or rendered relevant through 
talk and allusion. This means that the form of social competence and agency may 
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be mediated by the personal resources that are available to the child at different 
points in their development, but they being agentic is not primarily dependent 
on  attaining a particular level of development. This is not to deny or relativise 
cognitive or other developmental differences between adults and children, rather 
the excision of the relevance of an individual’s developmental capacity means the 
question of what is going on in social interaction is answered through analyses of 
the use made of language resources, material objects and embodied capacities to be 
social actors who engage in purposive action which has social consequences, along 
with a recognition of the role and distribution of intergenerational power in the 
interaction.  The social competence approach places a priority on understanding 
agentic action as a situated practical phenomenon which takes place at the everyday 
level and which involves social actors concerned with the accomplishment of their 
intentions.  An analysis of children’s interactions and their social competence must 
thus take account not only of the interaction but also of the materials (resources) 
which are enrolled in the interaction by any and all of the parties involved. This 
brings to the fore the dynamic of the interaction and also the relevance of socio-
historical contexts for both the form of the interactions and the material resources 
which are used. 
There are some key pieces of research which show how children have much 
greater levels of social competence than adults normally acknowledge, but that 
how this is transformed into being agentic depends on the particular constellation 
of competency skills, social and physical resources available to the child, as well 
as the structural power relations in which their interactions are embedded at any 
one particular time and in any one particular arena. Hence, children may be able 
to exercise agency in one setting but not in another, and may be able to draw on 
certain resources to support their agentic efforts at one time but not at another. 
Below I illustrate this using an exemplary study. 
Research using the agency and social competence  
approach with young children 
A study in a nursery setting by Danby and Baker shows how children can navigate 
their way between different social orders as skilled social actors, deploying and 
mobilising a range of resources to ‘act with purpose’ in and in pursuit of ›acting 
otherwise‹ to the dominant order. Thus children pursue their own social orderings 
and meaning-making at times when they are out of direct gaze of the teacher in 
the classroom. As Danby and Baker argue (1998b) in respect of the limitations of 
traditional pedagogical approaches to the importance of children’s play: 
Young children are routinely propelled into play 
situations where they are sometimes out of sight 
and out of earshot of the teachers. What goes 
on in those play situations is the very serious 
work of constructing social order (Denzin, 1982; 
Goodwin, 1985 and 1990). On close inspection 
this work turns out to be intricate and itself ori-
entated to a recognition that there is more than 
one social order to manage. (Danby and Baker, 
1998b: 157)
Noting that what children are able to achieve is constrained by the structural 
and material features of a setting such as the presence of adults who intervene 
in children’s interactions, they go on to argue that their own empirical study of 
children’s interactions in the nursery setting shows »how children make use of such 
structural features (the possibility and the fact of teacher intervention) as material 
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for their work of social organisation« (p157). In their detailed study of children’s 
interactions in the space of the nursery class, drawing on conversation analysis of 
video-recorded episodes, they found that when a child was upset within some peer 
interactions (such as whilst playing ›cars‹ or ›mummies and daddies‹) the teacher 
identified the crying child as the problem that needed solving via restoring good 
relations between the playing children, apportioning responsibility for the creation 
of the upset, and insisting on reconciliation actions by the ›guilty parties‹ such as an 
apology to the upset child by one or more of the other children involved or asking 
them to comfort the crying child with a hug. The final closure of the problem would 
come with the teacher insisting the children ›play nicely‹ and include the upset child 
in the game. However, Danby and Baker propose that this is the problem from 
the teacher’s point of view, based on an »expectation of cooperation and harmony 
existing in the early childhood classrooms« (p182). 
From the point of view of the children’s social orders the problem is more com-
plex. In one episode of interactions between three boys – Connell, David and John 
– Connell started to cry following a conflict about whether he could join in the 
play of the other two in a specific area of the nursery. Connell’s crying caused the 
teacher to come to the scene and intervene in the interaction. She sought to solve 
the problem of Connell crying and restore harmony in the group. However after she 
left the scene, the boys performed their own work to restore the within-group social 
order which consisted of a reassertion by David, out of hearing of the teacher, that 
he is the biggest and has more rights to be there than the others who are younger 
than him. David and John also resisted the caring work which the teacher tried to 
get them to perform for Connell in the course of her intervention. Put succinctly, 
what Danby and Baker observed was that although the teacher intervened in this 
and other events to restore harmony, once she left the scene the children acted out 
their own solutions to the upset through either repeating the teacher initiated care 
work but in a slightly different form, or by reasserting the prior conditions of the 
interaction but without creating further upset and hence without becoming visible to 
the teacher. Danby and Baker conclude that the children’s carefully choreographed 
actions after the teacher is out of the interaction strongly indicates that there is 
a »…disjunction between children’s social order and that of the teacher.« (p181). 
Whilst conditions of being a social actor and being agentic are fairly well establis-
hed now for children in middle childhood, the persistent dominance of socialisation 
and developmentalist perspectives in early childhood tends to divert our attention 
away from the agentic nature of their actions, their position as social actors, and 
the various resources, including talk, that they mobilise in support of the purposes 
of their interactions. This is partly a lack of recognition of ›what is going on‹ in 
young children’s interactions. If the children are not understood as social actors, this 
leads to an ideological downgrading of the legitimacy of certain forms of resources 
that children might deploy such as crying, and the hegemonic interpretation of 
children’s action as the product of, or material for, developmental processes and/
or the project of socialisation. Sewell (1992), however, argues that all members of 
society, however »destitute or oppressed« have some resources, be they human or 
non-human – which they can mobilise for themselves and that »…part of what it 
means to conceive of human beings as agents is to conceive of them as empowered 
by access to resources of one kind or another« (p7). Taking this rubric, the empi-
rical and theoretical questions we need to pose in respect of young children are 
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not only what kinds of social actorship are in play in particular interactions, what 
kinds of social competence are being deployed in pursuit of or resistance to which 
social orders, whose social order is prevailing, but also what kinds of resources are 
the actors in the setting deploying in pursuit of their own agency? These questions 
encompass all the actors in the setting, children and adults, and the setting itself. 
The role of development and socialisation processes will be relevant only in as far 
as they are rendered relevant by the actors and in that the setting.  
Discussion – relevance for policy and early childhood
The starting point of this paper was the question of how the reframing of children 
as social actors and the investigation of their capacity to be agentic could be ap-
plied to children in the early years of their life. I argued that this was an important 
question since in general the lives of young children are still largely researched and 
theorised through the dominant paradigms of developmentalism, familialism, and 
socialisation. These dominant discourses and perspectives leave the sociological 
domains of young children’s lives unexplored and unaccounted for. Applying the 
concepts of ›social actor‹ and ›agency‹ to early childhood does however require a 
close examination of what these concepts encapsulate in order to assess their rele-
vance and adequacy with respect to the lives of young children. In elaborating the 
concept of agency as it is formulated by Giddens for example, it becomes apparent 
that it cannot be imported ›wholesale‹ into a sociology of early childhood and that 
the question of social competence is highly important. The determination of whether 
an action is purposive must be established through robust empirical work as must 
the nature of that action, the place and meaning of its performance within the social 
orderings(s) of the setting(s), and the consequences of it. This is no different to 
what is needed with any other group of social actors to explore questions of their 
capacities to be agentic within all the structural conditions in which they live and act. 
Young children, however, may be subject to far greater structural limitations than 
many other groups in society through three mechanisms: one is the nature of the 
institutionalisation of their lives; the second is the dominance of intergenerational 
relationships which position them as developmental actors and hence reposition 
their actions as material for learning and correcting; the third is their limited access 
to resources they can mobilise in support of their own intentions – the question of 
scope and scale of the contexts within which they can be agentic. That said, I argue 
that there is compelling empirical evidence of the capacity of young children to be 
socially competent in highly complex and socially ordered ways, and within settings 
which operate multi-level social orderings, along with evidence of the significance 
of structural limitings of this capacity in the different settings in which they live. 
It is the intersection of these which constitutes the success or failure of individual 
children in respect of their agency. Recognition of this allows for a sociological 
understanding of them as social actors and the significance of their position within 
a range of social structurings.  
Having made this case, what are the implications for policy and practice? The so-
cial actor and social competence approach open up opportunities for incorporating 
children’s own perspectives on their lives into policy and intervention, allowing 
for a richer and more nuanced understanding of the problems with which policy 
and practice are concerned in respect of young children. For example, the recent 
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emphasis on early childhood education and care in a European context lacks the 
insights that the work of Evans and Fuller (1998), Stephen (2003), Stephenson 
(2009) and Cremin and Slater (2004) would contribute via their study of children’s 
perceptions of their nursery schools and their experiences in day care; similarly 
policy on poverty would benefit from a better understanding of how being poor is 
experienced in the lives of children in the kindergarten (Ridge, 2011), and research 
on children’s own perspectives on their wellbeing such as that done by Crivello et 
al (2009) makes a very positive addition to policy development and the analysis 
of social problems. Gillespie (2012) has shown how the inclusion of children in 
urban planning enhances not only the planning but theoretical understandings of 
urban spaces and places. 
More challengingly, Marchant (2013) argues the case for children as young as two 
years old being able to give evidence in court proceedings where they have been the 
victims of violence and/or sexual exploitation or witnesses to it. Finally, the work 
from the field of disability studies also provides a valuable corrective to assumptions 
about the prior need for children to have certain kinds of linguistic cognitive skills 
before they can be social actors or their actions can be understood within frames 
of social competence and agency. Of particular note is the work of Davies (1998) 
who researched the meanings of children with learning disabilities, Badham (2004) 
with respect to children’s contributions to setting research agenda. As is evident, 
there has been much work with young children and creative methods have been 
employed to explore their experiences, their perspectives, their status as social 
actors, and their deployment of social competences and agentic goals. Nonetheless, 
it still seems to remain the case that convincing arguments have to made each time 
against the silencing that comes with the application of developmentalist thinking. 
Finally, an example of the direct application of research findings into policy re-
commendations can be found with the work of Connolly et al (2002) who explored 
the cultural and political awareness of children aged between three years old and 
six in Northern Ireland. They found that it was crucial to encourage children from 
the age of three years »to appreciate and respect difference and cultural diversity« 
(p6), with work on addressing negative sectarian stereotypes and prejudices being 
important for children from the age of five onwards. 
Conclusions 
The idea of children as agentic needs careful treatment to ensure that research 
allows for the interplay of intergenerational orders, of other power relations, and 
of the effect of structural conditions. To this end a notion of social competence 
may be of use as is the concept of agency if it is taken as a way of conceptualising 
purposive action, without the need for discursive accounting by the individual 
social actor. Our approaches need to recognise that whilst modernist perspectives 
on childhood may locate the child somewhere between nature and culture, children 
are acting, being and living in the social world from the start of their lives and our 
research methods need to start from that point. 
Although always suspended as an empirical question, the agency and social 
competence perspectives create a climate in which children’s experiences of the 
world gain an added impetus not only for understanding particular phenomena in 
a more comprehensive way but also for incorporating children’s lives as they are 
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